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Herbert Simon’s work on scientific discovery deserves serious attention by 
philosophers of science for several reasons. First, Simon was an early advocate of ra­
tional scientific discovery, contra Popper and logical empiricist philosophers of sci­
ence (Simon 1966). This proposal spurTedon investigation of scientific discovery in 
philosophy of science, as philosophers used and developed Simon's notions of “prob­
lem solving” and “heuristics” in attempts to provide rational accounts of scientific 
discovery (See Nickles 1980a, Wimsatt 1980). Second, Simon promoted and devel­
oped many of the crucial techniques and methods used in cognitive science. One is 
the use of computers to model internal psychological processes, a technique central to 
his account of scientific discovery. Another is protocol analysis, the use of the verbal 
reports of experimental subjects in psychology to construct accounts of their psycho­
logical processes. Protocol analysis is given a detailed formulation by Simon (Simon 
and Ericsson 1984), and is modified for use in the study of scientific cognition in the 
paper on Krebs (Kulkami and Simon 1988). Third, Simon introduces normative pro­
posals for science based on his computational investigations of scientific discovery 
(See also Zytkow and Simon 1988). Simon's work can be viewed as a contribution to 
naturalized philosophy of science, which centrally features the derivation of norma­
tive proposals from descriptive accounts of science. His work can also be viewed as a 
contribution to the growing field of “cognitive science of science," which uses tech­
niques from the cognitive sciences to tackle issues in the philosophy of science.
In this paper I critically evaluate Simon’s recent work on scientific discovery,' I 
focus primarily on Scientific Discovery (Langley et al. 1987), which documents many 
computer programs that purportedly make scientific discoveries, and “The Process of 
Scientific Discovery” (Kulkami and Simon 1988), which is a detailed investigation of 
Krebs discovery of the ornithine cycle. I present several distinct criticisms of Simon’s 
work. First I argue that Simon’s descriptive account cannot distinguish discoveries as 
the product of an individual scientist’s psychological processes or as the product of a 
social process involving several scientists. Yet Simon argues that scientific discovery 
can be adequately accounted for by appealing to psychological processes. I offer two 
lines of argument to establish that this latter step is unjustified. The first is that
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Simon's method of protocol analysis does not provide sufficient evidence for the exis­
tence of the distinct psychological processes he claims underlie scientific discoveries. 
The second is that scientific discovery has a crucial social component that Simon can­
not account for. I conclude that as a result of these failures Simon’s descriptive char­
acterization of scientific discovery is inadequate, and further that this inadequacy is 
due to what I call “cognitive individualism.” 1 conclude the paper by considering the 
normative dimension of Simon’s account, and argue that his computer models of sci­
entific discovery can be best understood as contributions to what Clark Glymour has 
called "android epistemology.”
2. An Outline of Simon’s Project
In Scientific Discovery (Langley et al. 1987) Simon describes a set of computer 
systems that purportedly make scientific discoveries. Primarily he is concerned with 
systems that can make data driven discoveries, or discoveries of a particular relation­
ship in a certain (usually numerical) data set. The systems use a set of production 
rules (conditional statements) that represent heuristics (rules of thumb), which con­
strain operations on the data. Such a rule (or heuristic) for detecting regularities in nu­
merical data i s : “If the values of two numerical terms increase together, then consider 
their ratio” (Langley et al. 1987, p.66). The “discovery” of Kepler’s Third Law by 
such a system is characterized as a problem solving task, involving a search through 
the data, the “problem space,” to produce the desired goal, the law. The data are val­
ues for the periods of the planets (P) and their distances from the sun (D), and the de­
sired relationship (goal state) is D3/P2 = c.
Simon claims that the systems’ potential application extends beyond the particular 
scientific discoveries investigated, to providing an account of scientific discovery in 
general. The computer programs, the BACON programs, and other related programs, 
are progressively developed to deal with gradually more complex data, for example 
data requiring qualitative laws and attribute ascription. Scientific Discovery docu­
ments a large array of programs that Simon claims have discovered Kepler’s Third 
Law, Boyle’s Law, Snetl’s Law and many more.
Simon claims that the work
...seeks to investigate the psychology of the discovery process, and to provide
an empirically tested theory of the information-processing mechanisms that
are implicated in that process. (Langley et al. 1987, p.4)
The work is firmly embedded in his overall information processing approach in cog­
nitive science (See e.g. Simon 1969, Newell and Simon 1972). According to Simon, 
“the research is mainly limited to finding a set of mechanisms that is sufficient to ac­
count for discovery” (Langley et al. 1987, p.4). So Simon’s claims are that scientific 
discovery is a psychological process, and that a sufficient account of this process will 
be provided by the computer models.
In “The Processes of Scientific Discovery: The Strategy of Experimentation” 
(Kulkami and Simon 1988) Simon discusses Krebs experiments that led to the discov­
ery of the ornithine cycle. Simon explains that the BACON programs did not broach 
the issue of where data came from in data driven discovery. He claims that the pro­
cesses of designing experiments and observation were not investigated and that these 
latter are investigated in the work on Krebs. Simon’s computational analysis of scien­
tific discovery is governed by a guiding principle that scientific discovery is a collec­
tion of psychological processes and that these can be elicited by studying the work of
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scientists throughout history who have made important discoveries. Therefore the 
production system resulting from the work on Krebs is intended to complement the 
BACON discovery systems.
Simon argues that he can provide a reliable account of the psychological processes 
involved in Krebs’ discovery of the ornithine cycle by relying on Holmes’ (Holmes 
1980) historical work on Krebs’. Holmes* account is constructed from a combination 
of Krebs’ published work, his and his assistant’s laboratory notebooks and interviews 
with Krebs made years after the discovery. Holmes’ account provides the necessary 
protocols from which Simon derives heuristics, the proposed psychological mecha­
nisms that produced Krebs’ discovery. These heuristics have been embodied in the 
production system KEKADA, which simulates Krebs’ discovery. Overall Simon 
claims that Krebs’ discovery of the ornithine cycle was due to a set of psychological 
processes that Krebs possessed, and that these are derived from his scientific writings 
used as protocols, and captured in the computer program KEKADA.
3. The Descriptive Adequacy of Simon’s Account
Philosophers of science have turned to studies of scientific discovery as a reaction 
to the claims of Popper and the logical empiricist philosophers that discovery was not 
amenable toralional explanation (See e.g. Nickles 1980b). Scientific discovery is also 
the subject of investigation of historians and sociologists of science (See e.g.
Brannigan 1981, Pickering 1984, Galison 1987). The picture of discovery that arises 
from these investigations is by no means monolithic, rather one of a complex and var­
ied activity. Discovery is part psychological activity, part sociology of group accep­
tance, and part historical accident and timeliness. In contrast we see that Simon's ac­
count centers around the development of computer programs that arrive at the same re­
sults as great scientists in history. Simon argues that this approach provides a sufficient 
set of mechanisms to account for scientific discovery (Langley et al., p.4). Further he 
argues that the success of these computer programs will ‘‘show how simple informa­
tion processes ... can give an adequate account of the discovery process” (Langley et 
al., p.33). Simon’s descriptive account of scientific discovery shares none of the rich­
ness of the picture that arises from research in philosophy, sociology and history of sci­
ence, and I argue that this snakes it an insufficient account of scientific discovery.
Let us begin with the use of protocols. Simon’s own observations about the weak­
nesses of the method of protocol analysis can be extended into arguments against his 
use of this method to elicit the psychological processes involved in scientific discov­
ery. I conclude that protocol analysis provides insufficient evidence to support the ex­
istence of the proposed psychological processes underlying in scientific discovery.
Two methods of direct verbalizations are used to generate verbal reports from psy­
chology subjects: Thinking aloud and retrospective accounts (My account follows 
Simon and Ericsson 1984 and Ericsson and Oliver 1988). The former are recorded as 
the subject carries out the task under study, and the latter are recorded immediately 
after the activity under study has taken place to make sure that the subject still has the 
relevant information in short tenn memory. In the paper on Krebs Simon claims that 
scientist’s laboratory notebooks are closer in nature to retrospective reports than 
thinking aloud reports (Kulkami and Simon 19R8i. We have no thinking aloud reports 
in the Krebs case as the protocols are from a historical study not a psychology experi­
ment. When retrospective reports are used in psychology experiments they are made 
according to specific guidelines for remembering what was thought about during task 
performance (Ericsson and Oliver 1988), So Simon’s comparison between laboratory 
notebooks and retrospective reports is a weak one. Although laboratory notes are "
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taken at the end of particular tasks (and even at the end of the day or the week), they 
are not taken at the end of a particular psychological process. The notion of coming to 
the end of a psychological process is not a relevant factor for a scientist determining 
when to make notes in their laboratory notebook.
Scientists do not primarily aim at recording their thought processes during experi­
ments when making laboratory notebooks. For example Millikan’s notebooks (see 
Holton 1978) contained columns of figures and comments such as “beautiful, publish 
this.” This is good evidence that he was not always concerned with recording his psy­
chological processes, rather with recording his results and commenting on their use­
fulness. Scientists in the laboratory record important results, or outline replicable pro­
cedures for themselves to use on a future occasion, or for graduate students or techni­
cians to use in their absence.2 Laboratory notebooks do provide useful data about sci­
entific practice, but it is not necessarily evidence for the existence of particular psy­
chological processes of a particular scientist.^ Such writings could also be used to 
generate an account of the social processes involved in a discovery (see Latour and 
Woolgar 1979). On the evidence of laboratory notebooks it is not only difficult to dis­
tinguish between different psychological processes, but it is also difficult to distin­
guish between the psychological processes of individual scientists and the more inter­
active processes of all the participants in the laboratory. The type of evidence provid­
ed by scientists’ writings does not force one to the conclusion that particular psycho­
logical processes underlie scientific discovery.
In conclusion the analogy between verbal reports in psychology experiments, and 
laboratory notebooks as a resource for work on scientific discovery is strained for two 
reasons. First laboratory notebooks contain recollections, which may not have been 
made immediately after the putative psychological process they relate to occurred. 
Second, the laboratory notebooks do not contain information specifically about psy­
chological processes. The laboratory notebooks can only be used as data from which 
an attempt to derive an account of psychological processes is made, and they could 
equally be used to derive an account of social processes.
The use of scientists more public writings to gain information about their psycho­
logical processes is even more problematic. One of the problems with retrospective 
reports in psychology is that subjects often “fill in” their reports with information not 
directly reproduced from memory (Simon and Ericsson 1984). They will perhaps give 
some plausible reasons for a particular activity instead of trying to remember the actu­
al processes they went through (Cf. Nisbett and Wilson 1977). In a scientist’s pub­
lished work she is almost exclusively concerned with giving a plausible account of 
her results (in the form of reasons for these results), she is rarely if ever required to 
remember her psychological processes at the time of producing such results. Further 
she does not attempt to distinguish between reasons for results, and the psychological 
processes that led to such results. No principled method is available to distinguish be­
tween the two types of post facto reports: Ones that present psychological processes, 
and ones that present plausible reasons for a particular act (Cf. Nisbett and Wilson).
Leaving the issues surrounding protocols as insufficient evidence for the existence 
of psychological processes, a second line of argument challenges Simon’s claim that 
such processes provide a “sufficient” account of scientific discovery. Drawing evi­
dence from work in the sociology of science, I conclude that his cognitive individual­
ist account of scientific discovery is not sufficient as it cannot account for the social 
nature of scientific discovery.
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Simon’s approach to explaining scientific discovery is directed by his information 
processing psychology. Simon investigates scientific discovery as a process of “think­
ing man” (or thinking machine) (Simon 1969). His position is that the scientists under 
investigation use one or more of a common stock of psychological processes. These 
processes are heuristic driven search mechanisms. An important question is why one 
person’s use of some shared psychological processes would produce a scientific dis­
covery, whilst another person's use of it would not. Simon claims in earlier work that 
the environment is the essential governing factor in producing different results with 
the same processes (Simon 1969,1957), and yet he devotes no time in Scientific 
Discovery to describing how the environment is instrumental in producing the particu­
lar scientific discoveries he investigates. It is consistent with Simon’s information 
processing psychology to argue that, given our shared psychological processes any 
human could come up with scientific discoveries, if he or she were put in the right en­
vironment. Putting it another way, it is consistent with Simon’s account that factors 
other than the simple psychological processes he claims we possess are instrumental 
in producing scientific discoveries, and yet he leaves no room for such factors.
Despite this deficiency he claims that he provides a sufficient account of scientific 
discovery. I now consider some factors that a sufficient account of scientific discovery 
must to account for.
Simon pays no attention to the issue of how one establishes that a scientific dis­
covery has been made. A discovery's acceptance by the relevant scientific community 
is essential to its siatus as a discovery. And it is hard to separate this acceptance pro­
cedure from the process of discovery itself, a point argued by Brannigan in his Social 
Basis o f Scientific Discovery (1981). Brannigan uses several examples from the histo­
ry of science and exploring to illustrate his claim that the acceptance of a discovery 
by the relevant social group (the social context of the discovery), and the actual psy­
chological process of discovery are indistinguishable (Cf. Woolgar 1988, pp. 58-65). 
For example he assesses Columbus’ “discovery” of America (Brannigan 1981, pp. 
120-142) and Mendel's “neglected" discovery of the genetic basis of inheritance 
(Brannigan 1981, pp. 89-119), In both cases Brannigan argues that the special social 
contexts determined these discoveries. He argues that it was the preparations for 
Columbus’ voyage and the recognition of his achievement by royal sponsors that dis­
tinguish his discovery of America. And for Mendel it was the emergence of a context 
within modern biology for his work that rendered it a significant discovery, and it was 
not until such a context arose that it became a significant discovery.
The distinction between acceptance and discovery could perhaps be cashed out in 
terms of a clear distinction between cognitive and social factors of the scientific dis­
covery process. On this distinction the cognitive component of the discovery would be 
that part explained by Simon’s psychological models, say chronologically the part of a 
discovery up to the submission of a paper reporting the findings. The social component 
of the discovery could be the particular peer review process that led to the acceptance 
of the paper by a distinguished journal. But this hypothetical picture is too limited and 
obscures the complexity of scientific discovery. Simon’s own account of Krebs’ dis­
covery of the ornithine cycle gives us enough information to question any account 
based on such a straightforward distinction between cognitive and social factors.
Krebs’ work on the ornithine cycle was carried out with an assistant. For much of 
the time Krebs' assistant Henseleit did all the experimental work and took all the lab­
oratory notes, whilst Krebs was pursuing more theoretical work on this and other pro­
jects (Holmes 1980). Simon paraphrases Holmes’ account of the discovery, which in­
cludes an account of Henseleit’s contributions, yet KEKADA models the putative 
psychological processes of an individual scientist. Whether Krebs could have carried
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out the work leading to his discovery by himself is irrelevant here, as Simon aims to 
explain the actual discovery of the ornithine cycle (Kulkarni and Simon 1988, 
pp.140-143). But this discovery was produced by two cognitive agents whose interac­
tions were instrumental in the discovery, KEKADA however is an idealized version 
of the possible psychological processes of an individual discoverer of the ornithine 
cycle. Thus KEKADA is not a model of the actual discovery of the ornithine cycle. 
Here we have a clear example of a scientific discovery, the relevant cognitive product, 
which was produced by more than one working scientist, or by social interaction.
If the interactive nature of scientific discovery were accepted, there would still be 
nothing in principle that prevents computer modelling of such activity.4 For example 
Simon could claim that he was modelling the discovery of the ornithine cycle by pro­
ducing a production system that characterized two heuristic based problem solvers, 
and embodied them in a system that combined and synthesized their results. But 
Simon is a cognitive individualist with regard to scientific discovery.5 He holds that 
the cognitive process of scientific discovery can be accounted for by a model of an in­
dividual’s psychological processes. The cognitive individualist approach prevents him 
from being able to provide a sufficient account of scientific discovery as it leaves im­
portant facets of scientific discovery unaccounted for, such as the interactions of a 
group of researchers essential to the eventual production of the scientific discovery, 
the relevant cognitive product.
For Simon scientific discoveries are produced by the psychological processes of 
an individual system, be it an individual scientist or computer program. Yet Simon’s 
method of protocol analysis does not provide sufficient evidence to establish the exis­
tence of these psychological processes. Even if an account of the relevant psychologi­
cal processes could be provided it would not provide a sufficient account of scientific 
discovery, as it cannot account for scientific discoveries arising from social interac­
tion. Simon’s cognitive individualist account cannot encompass the richness of scien­
tific discovery revealed by sociologists and historians of science.
4. Normative Accounts of Scientific Discovery and Android Epistemology
Simon's computational models of discovery may not provide a sufficient account 
of scientific discovery, but perhaps they fulfill the role of refuting the claim, once held 
by the majority of philosophers of science, that scientific discovery is not amenable to 
rational analysis. Certainly Simon claims that his programs do this, but can this claim 
be sustained? Simon quotes what I call “Popper’s challenge” from The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery:
The work of the scientist consists in putting forward and testing theories. The
initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to
call for logical analysis nor be susceptible to it (Langley et al. 1987, p.38).
In contrast Simon claims that there can be a normative theory of discovery. But if 
Simon has not provided a sufficient descriptive account of scientific discovery, what 
becomes of his normative account? I will suggest that Simon’s normative account is 
best understood as a contribution to what Glymour has called “android epistemology” 
(Glymour 1987).
Logical empiricist philosophers and Popper concentrated on the development of the­
ories of confirmation or justification of scientific theories. They assumed a split be­
tween discovery and justification; the former was not amenable to logical analysis, 
whilst the latter was. Since Hanson’s work in the late fifties and sixties (see e.g. Hanson
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1958), the most sustained philosophical discussion of scientific discovery in the litera­
ture is collected in Nickles’ two volumes on scientific discovery (Nickles 1980b), The 
philosophers represented in this volume are still, like Popper and the logical empiri­
cists, concerned with the normative dimension of science, but the “friends of scientific 
discovery” (Nickles 1980a) hold that normative accounts of scientific discovery are 
possible. For example some ways of going about scientific discovery are better than 
others. Most "friends of scientific discovery" have been concerned with elevating the 
status of scientific discovery from a mysterious process to a process amenable to ratio­
nal analysis. The lalter task involves providing a normative account of discovery. These 
philosophers also aim to provide accurate descriptive accounts of various scientific dis­
coveries (See Nickles 1980b, Vol. II), They borrow historical or sociological methods 
to achieve this aim. An assumption driving this work is that if an accurate descriptive 
picture can be given of a great scientific discovery, it will inform the derivation of a 
normative account of scientific discovery in general (Nickles 1980a).
Simon has a similar project to the historically oriented philosophers of science 
(friends of scientific discovery), as he also aims to move from a descriptive to a nor­
mative account; the descriptive account constrains the norms derived. Simon focuses 
on both regulative and evaluative norms. Philosophers of science have traditionally 
been concerned with evaluative norms, for example norms for assessing a good theo­
ry. Regulaiive norms are those which, if followed, should produce effective proce­
dures, including scientific discoveries. This distinction between regulative and evalu­
ative norms is parallel to the one proposed by Nickles, who calls them "generative” 
and “consequentialist” norms (Nickles 1987).
Simon introduces his normative theory of discovery with the following claim:
“The efficacy (“rationality,” “logicality") [sic.] of the discovery process is as suscepti­
ble to evaluation and criticism as is the process of verification” (Langley et al.1987 
p.39). Simon is explicitly addressing Popper and the logical empiricists and their sep­
aration of the context of confirmation, or verification, from that of discovery. He 
claims that “a normative theory of discovery would be a set of criteria for judging the 
efficacy and the efficiency of processes used to discover scientific theories" (Langley 
et al.. p.45). Simon claims that this theory “rests on contingent propositions such as 
‘If process X is to be efficacious for attaining goal Y, then it should have properties 
A,B, and C '” (ibid.) (the evaluative normative concern), and that “given such norms, 
we would be justified in saying that a person who adhered to them would be a better 
scientist” (ibid.) (the regulative normative concern).
Simon’s work in Scientific Discovery is based on the assumption that there is no 
one scientific method, rather that there are several methods applicable over many do­
mains of science. He calls these “weak methods” to contrast them with more powerful 
specific methods within a particular domain of research. According to Simon weak 
methods are to be judged against the limiting case of random search. He claims that 
scientists are very seldom involved in random search, and rational activity is distin­
guished from random search by the fact that the best use of weak methods is em­
ployed. So in the formula for the normative theory of discovery quoted above, vari­
ables A.B, and C correspond to weak methods. Simon goes on to substitute “heuris­
tics” for the notion of “weak methods.” Hence the normative theory of discovery is 
restated as: "Rationality for a scientist consists in using the best means he has avail­
able - the bes1 heuristics - for narrowing the search down to manageable proportions" 
(Langley et al., 1987, p.47).
Simon’s normative theory looks less like a normative theory of scientific discov­
ery in general, than a theory of rationality construed as efficient search through a
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problem space. Of course Simon’s descriptive theory treats discovery as a form of 
problem solving, and on his account problem solving is just an heuristics based search 
through a problem space. So, from the point of view of his information processing 
perspective, rationality and rational scientific discovery may amount to nothing more 
than efficient search. But this is not a general normative theory of scientific discovery. 
It is still an open question whether Simon’s descriptive account captures scientists' 
psychological processes, and hence whether a scientist who adopted Simon’s regula­
tive norms, or more specifically used the best heuristics, would make better discover­
ies. It may well be true that if scientists were information processors whose work was 
best characterized by search through a problem space, they would become better dis­
coverers if they used the best heuristics available. But as we have already seen 
Simon’s descriptive account of discovery is far too limited, so a normative theory de­
rived from this account can have only a limited application.
Simon’s work is minimally consistent with that of naturalistic philosophers of sci­
ence (for example historically oriented philosophers of science) who claim that a nor­
mative account of scientific discovery can only be developed on the basis of, and at 
the same time as a descriptive account (Cf. Laudan 1977). The problem for Simon is 
that his descriptive account does not do justice to the complexity of the scientific dis­
covery process, for example the social relations involved in the process. Consequently 
the normative account he derives can provide no directives for groups of scientists. 
Further it provides no directives for different instances of complexity in scientific 
practice, such as when it would be best to move to a different level of explanation to 
solve a scientific problem. In biology, for example, the solution to a particular prob­
lem might require shifting from the cellular to the biochemical level. What Simon's 
account does provide is a set of norms for guiding the simulation of further scientific 
discoveries, provided simulation can be achieved by representing the activity in terms 
of an heuristics based search through a problem space. Simon even claims his ap­
proach cannot “replicate the historical details of various scientific discoveries” 
(Langley et al., p.62). Instead it can provide models of how such discoveries “might 
occur." If this is the overall claim of Scientific Discovery, then it is an entirely norma­
tive one, but we have seen that Simon also aimed to provide a descriptive account. I 
will conclude by suggesting that Simon’s normative claims may be best understood as 
guidelines to assist in building good scientific discovery machines, and so his work is 
best understood as a contribution to what Glymour has called “android epistemology” 
(Glymour 1987).
Glymour has proposed the name “android epistemology” for the production of the 
norms that regulate machines such as Buchanan and Mitchell’s meta-DENDRAL 
(Buchanan and Mitchell 1978), which have attained some level of success in scientif­
ic discovery (Glymour 1987). This project involves the development of machines to 
solve problems that humans have been accustomed to solving, especially problems 
that have traditionally interested philosophers. Scientific discovery is of central inter­
est to many philosophers, so for Glymour the development of norms for machines that 
make scientific discoveries is work in “android epistemology.”
Glymour has proposed a logic of scientific discovery implemented as a computer 
program (Glymour et al. 1988, and Glymour and Kelly 1989). The explicit difference 
between Glymour’s approach and Simon’s is that Glymour is not concerned with 
modelling actual human psychological processes (Glymour 1987, 1988). Glymour 
claims that “conventional artificial intelligence programs are little theories. The more 
theories look like theories of reasoning, the more the description of the program looks 
like a piece of philosophy” (Glymour 1988, p.200). Glymour’s view of philosophy is 
close to logical empiricism. He claims that the philosopher’s concern is to give a “re­
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construction of a domain of knowledge or form of reasoning" (Glymour 1988, p.201. 
Cf. Glymour 1981). Glymour shares with the logical empiricists the assumption that 
reasoning processes can be abstracted from their context. In the case of scientific 
practice it is argued that the scientists' reasoning can be appraised independently of 
other scientific practices. Glymour diverges from the logical empiricists in arguing 
that one can provide a logic of scientific discovery, which for him is a theory of the 
reasoning that produces scientific discoveries. He claims that Al programs provide 
him with the formal capability of presenting such a theory. Finally, Glymour’s ac­
count is an entirely normative one. His normative theory of discovery is proposed as a 
theory of how to make the best scientific discoveries (regulative norms). Or even 
stronger: How to go about discovering the truth. Recently he has claimed that he can 
give an account of the reasoning involved in discovering “the truth and nothing but 
the truth” (Glymour and Kelly 1989). Setting the external standards by which his 
norms are judged very high.
Simon’s and Glymour’s normative accounts share the same goals. Simon aims to 
provide an account of how the best scientific discoveries will be made. The way the 
account is implemented is in the construction of computer programs. Such programs 
bear little relation to the actual practice of scientific discovery, and so they fulfill one 
of Glymour’s requirements for contributions to android epistemology, as they do not 
replicate human endeavor (Glymour 1987). The requirement is that the android epis- 
temologist avoid what Glymour calls the “anthropocentric constraint”: “ [Tjhat the al­
gorithms executed by an android in performing a task must, at some appropriate level 
of description, be the very same algorithms that people execute in performing that 
task” (Glymour 1987, p.74). While Glymour explicitly avoids the “anthropocentric 
constraint,” Simon avoids it by default, due to the insufficiency of his descriptive ac­
count of scientific discovery.
Simon’s and Glymour’s accounts of scientific discovery are in direct competition 
if they are both understood as android epistemology. The decision between the two 
accounts may be determined by generality of application, say by the scope of the 
regulative norms in each account. If we consider the applicability of regulative norms 
in terms of the maxim “ought implies can,” then neither account is generally applica­
ble to human scientists. If one is concerned with the production of good science per 
se, then it is an empirical question which account is more generally applicable. The 
answer will depend on the quality of the new scientific work that the relevant norm- 
guided computers produce in the future.
Android epistemology is only one facet of the enterprise of cognitive science of 
science, others concern the description and explanation of human cognitive practices.6 
Glymour explicitly rejects this latter project. Simon, on the other hand, arrives at an­
droid epistemology by default, due to the inadequacy of his descriptive account. He 
provides guidelines for the design of efficient computer programs. Simon’s account of 
scientific discovery does little to increase our understanding of scientific discoveries 
made by humans throughout history, and provides no useful regulative norms for 
groups of scientists practicing research currently. These are two of the goals that a cog­
nitive science of science might achieve, and Simon's work fails to reach them.
Some more general proposals about naturalistic yet normative philosophy of sci­
ence arise from this analysis. The first is that if a naturalized philosophy of science is 
to make any claims of descriptive adequacy, it must make use of empirical work in 
sociology and histoiy of science as well as in cognitive science. The second is that if 
we are concerned with providing either regulative or evaluative norms for science, we 
should be concerned with their potential for application. The naturalistic turn in phi­
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losophy adds a new challenge to those who produce norms, which is that the norms 
must be applicable by human agents within certain constrained situations. The differ­
ence between android epistemology and a more general normative naturalistic episte- 
mology is that the latter should aim to apply to human scientists who have limited 
psychological capacities and must always act in social contexts.
Notes
'Throughout the paper I will refer to Simon’s collaborative work by Simon’s name 
alone. The citations credit his co-workers.
2It is worth noting that graduate students and technicians often make entries in the 
laboratory notebooks. Certainly they cannot be recording the internal psychological 
processes of their supervisor. We see below that Henseleit, Kreb’s assistant, took many 
of the notes the Holmes study was based on, yet Simon treats these as protocols.
3Cf. Tweney (1989) who derives an interesting account of what he calls “external 
memory” from a study of Faraday’s notebooks. (See also Gooding and James 1985.)
4Rob Cummins’ SOFT program is an example of a program that models the cogni­
tive activity of groups of people (Cummins 1983).
5It is important to note the qualification “with regard to scientific discovery.” In 
Simon’s work on administrative behavior and his use of the notion of satisficing, the 
claim that the individual was the prime unit of analysis was not central. See for exam­
ple his Models of Man (1957), which is interestingly subtitled “Mathematical Essays 
on Rational Human behavior in a Social Setting.” Simon’s work in information pro­
cessing psychology has many affinities with his work in organizational behavior, 
which was neutral with regards its units of analysis. The work was applicable to indi­
viduals or groups, such as business organizations. I detect a tension between Simon’s 
work on organizations and his work on scientific discovery, the former is neutral over 
its units of analysis and the latter is cognitive individualist. A possible resolution 
would be to view scientific discoveries as produced by organizations, and so the rele­
vant heuristics would govern group behavior. Simon nowhere indicates that this is the 
way his work on scientific discovery should be understood.
6Of course one cannot hold this sharp division between the goals of android epis­
temology and other more descriptive goals of cognitive science of science if one pre­
supposes that humans and computers cognitive capacities are both computationally 
bounded. Much empirical work in cognitive science shows that although there are 
many deficiencies of human cognitive practices, the important bounds to human cog­
nition are not purely computational (See eg. Faust 1984., cf. Cherniak 1986).
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